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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
SKYLER ERIC PULLEY,
Defendant-Appellant.

NO. 45326
Bingham County Case No. CR 20168830

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

Has Pulley failed to show that the district court abused its sentencing discretion when it
imposed concurrent sentences of five years with two years determinate upon his convictions for
two counts of criminal possession of a financial transaction card?
ARGUMENT
Pulley Has Failed Show That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion
A.

Introduction
Sean Cook, whom his father describes as “‘slow and handicapped,’” entrusted Skyler Eric

Pulley with his ATM card and PIN. (PSI, p. 3.) Pulley used the card and PIN several times to
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withdraw money at a credit union and a casino. (PSI, p. 3.) Pulley admitted he used the money
for methamphetamine and gambling. (PSI, p. 4.)
The state charged Pulley with eight counts of criminal use of a financial transaction card.
(R., pp. 60-63.) Pursuant to a plea agreement he pled guilty to two counts of criminal use of a
financial transaction card and the state dismissed the remaining six counts. (R., pp. 110-11.) The
district court imposed concurrent sentences of five years with two years determinate, and retained
jurisdiction. (R. pp. 135-37, 156-58.)
Pulley filed a motion for reconsideration of the sentence (R., pp. 148-49), which the district
court denied (R., pp. 169-76). The district court also relinquished its retained jurisdiction. (R.,
pp. 163-67.)
On appeal Pulley argues the district court abused its discretion in the original sentences,
denying his motion for reconsideration, and relinquishing jurisdiction. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 36.) He has failed to show an abuse of discretion, however.

B.

Standard Of Review
The length of a sentence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard considering the

defendant’s entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007) (citing
State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460, 50 P.3d 472, 475 (2002); State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201,
159 P.3d 838 (2007)). It is presumed that the fixed portion of the sentence will be the defendant's
probable term of confinement. Id. (citing State v. Trevino, 132 Idaho 888, 980 P.2d 552 (1999)).
Where a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it
is a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing
State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000)).
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When considering whether the sentence was an abuse of discretion, “this Court
considers: (1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of
discretion; (2) whether the trial court acted within the boundaries of its discretion
and consistently with the legal standards applicable; and (3) whether the trial court
reached its decision by an exercise of reason.”
State v. Fisher, 162 Idaho 465, 398 P.3d 839, 842 (2017) (quoting State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 828,
834, 264 P.3d 935, 941 (2011)).
“A motion for reduction of sentence under I.C.R. 35 is essentially a plea for leniency,
addressed to the sound discretion of the court.” State v. Burggraf, 160 Idaho 177, 180, 369 P.3d
955, 958 (Ct. App. 2016). “When presenting a Rule 35 motion, the defendant must show that the
sentence is excessive in light of new or additional information subsequently provided to the district
court in support of the Rule 35 motion.” State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203, 159 P.3d 838, 840
(2007).
The decision to relinquish jurisdiction is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial
court and will not be overturned on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion. See State v. Hood,
102 Idaho 711, 712, 639 P.2d 9, 10 (1981); State v. Lee, 117 Idaho 203, 205-06, 786 P.2d 594,
596-97 (Ct. App. 1990). A court’s decision to relinquish jurisdiction will not be deemed an abuse
of discretion if the trial court has sufficient information to determine that a suspended sentence
and probation would be inappropriate under I.C. § 19-2521. State v. Chapel, 107 Idaho 193, 194,
687 P.2d 583, 584 (Ct. App. 1984).

C.

Pulley Has Shown No Abuse Of The District Court’s Discretion
To bear the burden of demonstrating an abuse of discretion, the appellant must establish

that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the sentence was excessive. State v. Farwell, 144
Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d 397, 401 (2007). In determining whether the appellant met his burden,
the court considers the entire sentence but, because the decision to release him on parole is
3

exclusively the province of the executive branch, presumes that the determinate portion will be the
period of actual incarceration. State v. Bailey, 161 Idaho 887, 895, 392 P.3d 1228, 1236 (2017)
(citing Oliver, 144 Idaho at 726, 170 P.3d at 391). To establish that the sentence was excessive,
he must demonstrate that reasonable minds could not conclude the sentence was appropriate to
accomplish the sentencing goals of protecting society, deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution.
Farwell, 144 Idaho at 736, 170 P.3d at 401. A sentence is reasonable “‘if it appears necessary to
accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related goals
of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution.’” Bailey, 161 Idaho at 895–96, 392 P.3d at 1236–37
(quoting State v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, 8, 368 P.3d 621, 628 (2015)).
The district court considered Pulley’s juvenile and criminal record, including that the
present convictions are Pulley’s second and third felony convictions, respectively, and that some
of his prior offenses also involved theft. (Sent. Tr., p. 11, Ls. 1-5; p. 12, Ls. 2-8.) It considered
the recommendations of the pre-sentence investigation and the legal standards it was to apply.
(Sent. Tr., p. 11, Ls. 6-20.) It also considered Pulley’s age (26), risk to reoffend (moderate),
probationary history (prior probation violations), and substance abuse issues and treatment (not
successfully treated and relapsed). (Sent. Tr., p. 11, L. 21 – p. 12, L. 1; p. 12, Ls. 9-17.) The
record reveals no abuse of discretion.
Pulley argues the district court abused its discretion because (1) he lawfully acquired the
financial transaction card and only unlawfully used it; (2) “successfully completed drug court in
the past, and should have been provided with another chance at meaningful community-based
treatment”; (3) the pre-sentence investigator, prosecutor, and defense counsel all recommended
probation; and (4) he “expressed a desire to be a productive member of society and a role model
to his children.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 4.) This argument fails because (1) he pled guilty to two
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counts of “use of a fraudulently obtained card” (R., pp. 10-11 (emphasis added)); (2) his prior
treatment and probation were not “successful” in the sense that Pulley did not commit further
crimes; (3) the district court specifically considered the recommendations of probation, but they
were only recommendations; and (4) of course he did. Pulley has failed to show an abuse of
sentencing discretion in the concurrent sentences of five years with two years determinate upon
his convictions for two counts of criminal possession of a financial transaction card.

D.

Pulley Has Shown No Abuse Of Discretion In The Decision To Relinquish Jurisdiction
Pulley asked to be removed from the retained jurisdiction program. (Special Progress

Report.) Based on Pulley’s self-requested removal from the program the district court relinquished
jurisdiction. (R., pp. 163-67.) Pulley has failed to show an abuse of discretion by the district court.

E.

Pulley Has Shown No Abuse Of Discretion In The Denial Of Is Motion For
Reconsideration
Pulley supported his Rule 35 motion with a letter he wrote. (R., pp. 148-51.) Among the

claims in the letter, Pulley asserted that the “victim in my case” and the victim’s father were “there
for [him] on [his] behalf,” and that the victim’s father had offered him a job. (R., p. 150.) The
district court denied the motion. (R., pp. 169-76.) The court determined the original sentence was
reasonable, reiterating that it had considered, but ultimately rejected, the recommendations of
probation, in part because hits crime involved stealing “from a mentally-handicapped friend a coworker,” using his ATM card for illegal drugs and gambling “until he could not get any more
money off the card.” (R., pp. 171-72.) The court stated it had also considered Pulley’s criminal
and juvenile records and his mixed history on probation. (R., p. 172.) The district court found
the victim’s forgiveness and the victim’s father’s willingness to give Pulley a job “commendable,”
but concluded this “does not show this Court that Pulley can be successful on probation, given
5

Pulley’s past conduct.” (R., p. 173.) The district court also considered, but rejected, Pulley’s other
claims in the letter that he would succeed on probation. (R., pp. 173-74.)
Pulley argues the court abused its discretion because his “offense was not severe enough
to warrant the sentence imposed,” the “victim and his family appeared to support Mr. Pulley’s
request for leniency,” and he “expected to be placed on probation after pleading guilty.”
(Appellant’s brief, p. 6.) This argument is without merit.
Pulley’s attempt to minimize the severity of his crimes should be rejected. He acquired the
ATM card and PIN number of a mentally-handicapped friend and drained his bank account to buy
methamphetamine and gamble. (R., pp. 171-72 (considering facts of crimes).) In light of his long
history of thefts and other criminal acts (PSI, pp. 4-8), Pulley’s second and third adult felonies
were indeed serious.
Pulley’s claim the victim and his father are supportive also fails to show an abuse of
discretion. The district court specifically considered this assertion and concluded it did not change
its analysis of whether probation would be successful. (R., p. 173.) Pulley does not address the
district court’s analysis. (Appellant’s brief, p. 6.)
Pulley’s argument that he “expected” to be placed on probation was rejected because the
district court found it had engaged in a complete colloquy and Pulley, who in fact understood the
potential consequences of his guilty plea. (R., p. 174.) Pulley ignores the district court’s findings.
The district court considered Pulley’s submission and determined that the sentences were
proper as imposed. Pulley has failed to show an abuse of discretion.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of the district court and
the orders relinquishing jurisdiction and denying Pulley’s Rule 35 motion.
DATED this 30th day of May, 2018.

__/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen_________________
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 30th day of May, 2018, served a true and correct
copy of the attached RESPONDENT’S BRIEF by emailing an electronic copy to:
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.

__/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen_________________
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
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